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In the context of the computational and 
algorithmic revolution, the digital image more 
than ever elevates the status of representations 
to the sphere of processes and operations. In a 
more general context, images can be seen as 
cultural agents, progressively developing new 
habits by promoting mediations between multiple 
subjects, whether human or nonhuman. From this 
perspective, we may question what characterizes 
the dynamics of those images. Can we consider 
digital images to be semiotic agents? Admitting 
this premise implies highlighting images not only 
as results or instruments but as integrated 
participants in processes. In light of this, we 
explore the digital image as a semiotic agent, 
from a Peircean semiotic perspective, from which 
the digital image can be seen as a sign, a 
dialogical being inserted in a network of relations. 
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1 | INTRODUCTION 
In the social and cultural contexts images are 
usually associated with a conventional model of 
communication that considers two agents: the 
sender and the receiver. Although it is an 
acceptable perspective, this form of 
communication neglects at least two instances: 
images as signs in themselves and the complex 
contexts they are involved in. 
Advances of technologies and digital media give 
rise to the emergence of complex instruments for 
image creation, and systems that are increasingly 
more implicated in the processes of image 
production. In this context of computational and 
algorithmic revolution, computational systems 
become able not only to produce images but also 
to interpret distinct processes related to them. 
Thus, digital images more than ever elevate their 
status from representations to the sphere of 
processes and operations (e.g. Nake, 2004, 
2008, 2016; Nake & Grabowski, 2017; Gonzalez 
and Woods, 2002; Farocki, 2004; Fuller et al., 
2008; Manovich, 2013, 2017, Paglen, 2014).  
In this regard, we emphasize digital images as 
active subjects of processes. Such a role is 
manifested especially in the emergent and 
growing fields of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and 
Computer Vision, in which image-related 
processes are gaining prominence. 
This tendency of digital images to trigger 
processes can be seen as an index of their 
abstraction and symbolic potential. On that 
account, this paper questions digital images as 
semiotic agents, discussing conceptual 
foundations to understand the expansion of the 
image in cultural and technological processes.  
It first examines the emergence of digital image 
as a symbolic technology. Then, it explores it in 
the context of the convergence of media, drawing 
differences between processes of images as 
symbols that involve mechanical and 
computational machines. From a Peircean 
semiotic perspective, we discuss the potential 
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character of images as semiotic agents, in the 
sense of producing processes and signs. 
2 | IMAGE AS A SYMBOLIC TECHNOLOGY 
Firstly, and foremost, we should mention that the 
notion of agency presented in this paper goes 
beyond a biological assumption. The notion of the 
subject of action assumed by images here 
reverberates in a nonhuman-centered view of the 
agent. In addition to this, to think about digital 
images as semiotic agents requires 
understanding what type of image we are talking 
about.  
One of the first media theorists to discuss 
symbols as mediators between culture and 
nature was Vilém Flusser. A closer look into his 
ideas of staircase of abstraction (1983) and of a 
new imagination (1990) developed in the context 
of his theory on technical images give us valuable 
information to understand the evolution of the 
image as a symbol, code, and instrument. 
According to Flusser, traditional images can be 
understood as “something ‘out there’ in space 
and time that they have to make comprehensible 
to us as abstractions” (1983, 8). Traditional 
images represent something usually external to 
the image itself. This quality is essential for 
understanding messages carried by images. 
Those messages encode events into situations, 
processes, and scenes. Flusser adds that those 
images are supposed to be maps to guide human 
beings in the world. 
Such a situation was changed with the invention 
of text. Text appears as a new code that provokes 
a “tearing” of traditional images. With the 
invention of writing, humans took one step 
beyond images. Since texts do not signify the 
world but the images they tear up; concepts do 
not mean natural phenomena, but ideas about 
them. Furthermore, to decode texts is hence to 
discover images signified by them; images 
evidenced by the increasingly abstract concepts 
contained in the texts. However, as mediators, 
texts can also obscure images they intend to 
represent, and by struggling against images, 
texts may suffer the loss of their imaginative 
competence.  
Technical images are post-writing and post-
historic. Differently from traditional images, they 
are produced by apparatuses, which are 
themselves products of technique. Ontologically, 
“technical images are abstractions of the third 
order: they abstract from texts which abstract 
from traditional images which themselves 
abstract from the concrete world” (Flusser, 1983, 
p. 14). 
These processes of abstraction in respect of 
technical images can be seen from the Peircean 
notion of the action of the sign or semiosis. 
Semiotics is defined as “the doctrine of the 
essential nature and fundamental varieties of 
possible semiosis” (CP 5.488) which involves “a 
cooperation of three subjects, such as a sign, its 
object, and its interpretant” (CP 5.484). Peirce 
defines sign (to which Flusser called symbol) as 
a medium (MS 339, 1906), but not as one which 
mediates between an addresser and an 
addressee. Instead, “the sign mediates between 
its object, which it represents, and its interpretant, 
which is its interpretative effect”. According to 
Peirce, a sign “endeavors to represent, in part at 
least, an Object, which is therefore in a sense the 
cause, or determinant, of the sign” (CP 6.347) 
and resulting in a further sign, the interpretant, 
which provides an interpretation of the first sign in 
relation to its object. Thus, semiosis is related to 
the action of the sign, that is, the continuous flow 
in which a sign is interpreted or translated into 
another, which, in its turn, is interpreted into 
another, ad infinitum.  
Despite their abstract nature, technical images 
are oftentimes considered by human observers 
not only as images but also as mediations of 
reality (Flusser, 1983). Thus, they may not 
suggest a need of decoding, since their meaning 
seems to be visible through the observation of 
their surface. However, they derive from abstract 
generalizations that come from texts that 
originate images which, in their turn, conceive the 
concrete world. It is in this sense that, contrary to 
what one thinks, decoding technical images 
demands the knowledge of codes originated from 
highly complex and sophisticated symbols. They 
are “not only symbolic but represent even more 
abstract complexes of symbols than traditional 
images. They are metacodes of texts which, as is 
yet to be shown, signify texts, not the world out 
there” (1983, p. 15).  
In A New Imagination, Flusser (1990) discusses 
the gesture of creating images. Although he does 
not provide a distinction between technical 
images and those made by computers, we can 
find some insightful ideas towards synthetic 
images and clues to understand the process of 
abstraction that follows with digital images.  
According to Flusser, this new gesture of image 
creation follows an alphanumerical code which 
movement is quite different from alphabetical 
writing. “The linear gesture of writing tears the 
pixels from the image surface, but it then threads 
these selected points (bits) torn from the image 
into lines” (1990, p. 112). The numeric notation is 
not a sliding gesture, but a gesture of choice. 
“The numeric code broke out of the alphabetical 
code, freed itself from the pressure of linearity, 
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and switched over from numeric to digital” (1990, 
p. 113). To Flusser, this refers to an analytic, 
disaggregating intention, by which the thought 
reaches a high level of unsurpassable 
abstraction. Therefore, it will be possible to 
analyze the processes in the first place, then the 
events, and, finally, the world of objects. It is in 
this level of abstraction, expressed by symbolic 
technologies, that we cope with dialogical 
images. 
Arjen Mulder argues that “the way to find meaning 
in dialogical images is to forget about linguistic 
meanings: dialogical images in Flusser are about 
agency” (2016, p. 2), and agency concerns the 
idea of “viewer/user that click beyond the image, 
change it when needed, or even synthesize them 
from scratch, in purely numerical form” (2016, p. 
2). Mulder, however, seems to discuss the role of 
the image as a symbol only in instrumental terms. 
It should be observed that in this new imaginative 
experience, the production of images is not 
restricted to an idea of a human producer and 
their interaction with computational systems but 
may also include the relations between the signs 
themselves. 
With this concept of new imagination, we may 
highlight the creative potential of symbol 
processing. Since the technological development 
of media leads to a not necessarily deterministic 
production of signs, it appears to potentialize the 
play, the search, the surprise in the context of 
cultural creation.  
3 | IMAGE AS A PROCESS OF THE SIGN ON 
SYMBOL PROCESSING MACHINES 
The Although digital and computational 
revolutions have sparked deep changes in our 
environment and ways of work, and hence in the 
cognitive ecology (Couchot, 2011), this did not 
necessarily imply an extinction of its processes 
(Bellour, 1997) nor precedent media (Bolter and 
Grusin, 2000). 
It is essential to emphasize that the processes of 
abstraction are expressed in the continuous 
course of media hybridization. Santaella (2013) 
observes that as computers began producing 
images, texts, and saving files, media 
convergence becomes a rule. Marked by the 
origin of engraving, we moved from a pre-
photographic paradigm (e.g. painting) to a 
photographic one. This transition started the 
principle of reproducibility. Then, we had the 
transition from the photographic paradigm to a 
post-photographic, whose passage marked the 
interruption of the dependence of image on 
concrete objects (Santaella and Nöth, 1997). The 
fourth paradigm of the image, as argued by 
Santaella (2013), involves the advent of 
computational systems and connectivity, and is 
no longer about passages, but rather genealogies 
of images, a type of genealogy in which they are 
already immersed in the mixtures. 
The frontiers between visual representations and 
the technological media became blurred. Thus, 
images might be seen both as instruments and 
representations. Let us examine some 
differences between symbol processing in trivial 
tools (or mechanical instruments) and 
computational machines.  
In his theory regarding technical images, Flusser 
(1983) developed the notion of apparatus: a tool 
that produces techno-pictures (he uses the 
photographic camera as a prototype of 
discussion to this idea). Through this notion, we 
can understand that even a common 
photographic camera, which operates in a 
mechanical way, produces pictures through a 
process of transformation of signs. This operation 
describes, for example, the conversion of light 
rays reflected in an object into another sign, 
which may be the negative or the developed 
image. In view of this, the camera follows a 
model, a program, which determines the process 
of cultural sign production. As mentioned by Nöth 
(2009), by discussing the apparatus in the sense 
of media, Flusser draws attention to the invention 
of instruments that produce symbols, that is, 
instruments of sign production.  
Although technical devices operate in a 
deterministic way – with means that their 
production is completely determined by their input 
–, the fact that they are involved in the production 
of a sign cannot be ignored. On account of that, 
Nöth (2009) points out that there is no doubt they 
can be considered semiotic instruments or 
machines. To him, what differentiates semiotic 
instruments from semiotic machines is their 
degrees of complexity and their semiotic 
potential. Text processing machines, for 
instance, “differ from their nondigital precursors, 
such as the manually operated duplicating 
machine or even the simple typewriter, only in 
their degree of efficiency” (2009, p. 28). 
It is also relevant to notice that the signs that a 
“camera ‘produces’ by its proper agency 
(disregarding the photographer who is indeed a 
sign producer) are natural signs, which cannot be 
said to be produced because natural signs have 
no sign producer” (Nöth, 2009, p. 28). So, a better 
way to say in regard to the mechanical camera is 
that it does not necessarily ‘produces sign’ but 
‘processes sign’. As deterministic machines, they 
present “a heteronomous semiotic agency since 
their goals are determined by the purposes of 
operators and programmers, which are external 
agents from the point of view of the machine” 
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(2009, p. 27). Otherwise, the agency of this kind 
of semiotic machines is reduced to the 
processing of other signs by efficient causality. 
Efficient causality corresponds to the cause-
effect phenomena in a process determined by 
irreversible physical laws, that is, “the Brute 
Actuality of things and facts” (Peirce, CP 6.455). 
The force of efficient causality belongs to the 
category of dyadic relations. Given this, we can 
assume that instruments in general, which 
collaborate in processes of action or work, are 
efficient or deterministic causes (Nöth, 2009). 
Final causality, on the other hand, is related to the 
category of triadic interaction, that is, the long-
term causality of general laws, purposes, ideas, 
semiosis. In fact, the sign “act by final semiotic 
causation insofar as their semiotic potential can 
reach its effect by different means” (Nöth, 2009, 
p. 19). This action, however, cannot be possible 
without the efficient causes to convey their 
messages. In accordance with these premises, 
“the agent in the process of semiosis in which the 
sign creates an interpretant, is the sign, not the 
addresser, and the agency of the sign is one of 
final causality” (2009, p. 19). 
There is a significant difference when dealing with 
sign processing in computational systems. Since 
computers are able to process both numbers and 
symbols (Newell, 1980; Nake 1998; Nöth, 2001, 
2004) they can be seen as apparatuses 
processing signs and as machines performing 
work. In general, this means they are co-agents 
of sign processing and work not only as 
instrumental replicators of signs but also “signs 
replicating themselves as signs” (Nöth, 2009, p. 
27). 
In addition to this, the process of image creation 
and interpretation in computational environments 
admits a variety of procedural combinations. In 
the field of image processing, for example, those 
variations can be understood as distinct types of 
computerized processes on images, such as low-
, mid- and higher-levels (Gonzalez and Woods, 
2002). The low-level involves primitive operations 
such as image pre-processing, in which both 
inputs and outputs are images. Mid-level 
processing concerns to “tasks such as 
segmentation (partitioning an image into regions 
or objects), description of those objects to reduce 
them to a form suitable for computer processing, 
and classification (recognition) of individual 
objects” (2002, p. 2). This process is 
characterized by the fact that its inputs generally 
are images, but its outputs are aspects and 
information extracted from those images, as in 
image analysis. The higher-level processing 
involves forms of interpretation of an ensemble of 
recognized objects, and at the continuum in AI, 
cognizing on systems.  
On account of that, let us examine the image not 
only as a product or a cultural sign but also as a 
possible co-actor of sign processing; a role that 
outlines its operation as semiotic agent. 
4 | SOME ASPECTS OF THE DIGITAL IMAGE 
AS A SEMIOTIC AGENT 
In the field of computational studies, Frieder Nake 
seems to be the first to introduce the notion of 
algorithmic image as a sign. Based on Peirce’s 
Theory of Signs, Nake (1997) sought to develop 
a theoretical basis to the computer science that 
he called “technical semiotic”.  
According to him, the artifacts developed in 
computational contexts are characterized by a 
surface and subface duality. The surface is the 
analog sensorial layer through which signs can 
be communicated to humans, and the subface is 
the immaterial and algorithmic substrate of the 
medium, where computation, code, and 
processes are developed (Nake, 2004, 2008, 
2016). With those notions, Nake repositions the 
image from a linear and isolated sign to a 
complex one with procedural bias. 
The concepts of surface and subface emphasize 
not only the involvement of the semiotic machines 
in processes of creation of images but also the 
potential nature of the image itself as a code. 
Moreover, it requires attention to the continuous 
dynamic between the concepts, a condition that 
reduces dualistic ideas regarding images. Thus, 
Nake argues that to understand the effects of sign 
processing of algorithmic images – and among 
them are artistic possibilities – it is fundamental 
to approach the algorithm image as a semiotic 
entity. 
Both dynamic and continuous characteristics of 
sign processing are also related to the Peircean 
notion of semiosis. One way to comprehend 
semiosis in the context of the semiotic agent may 
come from understanding Peirce’s concepts of 
efficient causality and final causality that we 
presented previously.  
The potential of the image to create even more 
innovative processes and signs, which respond 
not only to an agency determined by the sign 
stipulated by the programmer or the operator, 
highlights the semiotic creativity inherent in the 
sign processing itself. The condition of continuity 
and variety of the image expressed especially by 
its nature as an algorithmic substratum of the 
medium, evidence possible characteristics of 
final causes in image-related processes. 
However, since the materiality related to the 
efficient causality of the sign, the materialities and 
aesthetics involved and derived by those 
processes are examples of efficient causes. 
Journal of Science and Technology of the Arts 
Vol. 12, No. 1 (2020) · Special Issue: Consciousness Reframed 
https://doi.org/10.34632/jsta.2020.8195 15 
Thus, among the instances of efficient causes are 
included the media through which the image 
appears to us on its visible format (e.g. the 
computer screen and the printer); the tools that 
are used, for example, to edit, interact or print 
images; and the hardware that makes possible 
these scenarios. 
The development of image-related technologies, 
devices, and programs has been positively 
impacting the increasing potential of the image as 
a semiotic agent. Thereby, the digital image 
cannot be disconnected from this context of new 
forms of semiosis production. However, this does 
not imply that they have a semiotic agency 
autonomy themselves since their action (in the 
sense of intentionality) are related to a multiple-
agent context. 
5 | CONCLUSION 
Taking a Peircean semiotic perspective, we 
discussed distinct approaches and potentialities 
seeking to explore the digital image as a semiotic 
agent. We started examining some thoughts 
about the evolution of the image as a symbol, 
code, and instrument, by discussing Flusser’s 
ideas of technical images as means of mediations 
of reality. Then, we explored its processes of 
abstractions in the context of media hybridization, 
where apparatuses were apprehended in the 
sense of media, that is, as instruments of sign 
processing. In this context, images may act both 
as instruments and representations. Finally, we 
briefly examined the digital image in the field of 
computational studies, in which its semiotic 
potential goes beyond the response to an agency 
determined by the programmer. 
The idea of digital image as a semiotic agent 
means understanding them not only as objects 
that contain information, or as products of human 
actions, but also as active signs that may 
potentially be agents in new processes of signs. 
If we understand image as a sign, and therefore 
as a medium, we will see that such potential is 
something intrinsic to images in general but was 
intensified with the computational revolution.  
From the sign processing perspective, one may 
note that the levels of the action of the image are 
revealed through its own role alongside the 
agents involved in the production of images, 
whether humans or nonhumans. Its semiotic 
agency potential also differs according to the 
apparatus (technological systems and devices) 
and distinct levels of determination. In the context 
of technical images, for example, semiotic 
agency is usually determined by external agents 
(operators and programmers). In the algorithm 
context, on the other hand, digital images have 
the potential to become more autonomous 
agents. Those abilities involve complex and 
complementary cycles in which the image 
codifies and is decoded. That is, it interprets 
(outputs and feedbacks) and is also interpreted 
(generates new inputs and outputs), especially 
when integrated with machine learning systems. 
There is yet much to be discussed regarding the 
digital image as a semiotic agent. Here we sought 
to present some initial thoughts that may spark 
discussions with respect to the digital image as 
semiotic agents. This general role is becoming 
more evident after the developments from 
cybernetics, automata theory, and general 
systems theory to the new technologies of 
intelligence (Donald, 1991; Santaella, 2007). On 
account of that, Artificial Intelligence and 
Computer Vision, where image processing is a 
central subject for the development of intelligent 
systems, appear as relevant fields to be explored 
in further work. 
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